Modern network systems such as transportation, manufacturing, and communication systems are subject to cyber-physical disruptions. Cyber disruptions compromise sensing and/or actuating which closed-loop control relies on, and physical disruptions undermine network capability. This paper develops a novel approach to analysis and design of traffic control for dynamic flow networks subject to a rather broad class of disruptions. We consider a single-origin-single-destination acyclic network with possibly finite link storage spaces. Both cyber and physical disruptions are modeled as a set of discrete modes that modify the control and/or the network flow dynamics. The network switches between various modes according to a Markov process. By considering switched, piecewise polynomial Lyapunov functions and exploiting monotonicity of the network flow dynamics, we analyze network throughput under various disruption scenarios and show that cyber-physical disruptions can significantly reduce network throughput. For control design, we derive two results analogous to the classical maxflow min-cut theorem: (i) for a network with observable disruption modes, there exist mode-dependent controls that attain the expected-min-cut capacity; (ii) for a network with infinite link storage spaces, there exists an open-loop control that attains the minexpected-cut capacity. We also design a closed-loop control for general cases and derive an explicit relation from the control to a lower-bound for throughput. Our approach is illustrated by a series of numerical examples.
Introduction
Dynamic flow networks are a class of useful models for a variety of engineering systems including transportation systems, production lines, and communication networks [1, 2] . These systems are subject to disruptions both in the physical part and in the cyber part. In the physical part, link flows can be disrupted by capacity-reducing events such as traffic incidents [3] , station failures [4] , and hardware malfunctions [5] . In the cyber part, real-time state observation and feedback actuation can be compromised by sensor or communication failures. For example, the failure rate of traffic sensors in some transportation facilities can be as high as 40% [6] . Similar challenges exist in production lines [7] and communication networks [8] . Cyber disruptions may degrade the effectiveness of feedback controllers and lead to losses in the physical part [9] . Both types of disruptions are hard to predict and have to be modeled as stochastic processes [5, 7, 8, 10] . Since network systems involve very large numbers of cyber-physical components, it is neither economically feasible nor technically necessary to prevent all disruptions. Instead, a practical solution is to integrate disruptions in modeling to achieve resiliency-by-design [11] . However, limited models and methods have been developed for systematically analyzing network resiliency and designing control strategies in the face of these disruptions.
In this paper, we develop a novel approach to evaluating network efficiency (in terms of throughput and boundedness of delay) under the influence of cyber-physical disruptions and designing control strategies that mitigate disruption-induced efficiency losses. Our method applies to a rather general class of dynamic flow models, control actions, and disruptions. The network can have either finite or infinite link storage spaces, and either smooth or non-smooth flow functions. The control actions include dynamic routing and flow management (e.g. ramp metering in transportation). We consider cyber disruptions including missing/faulty state observation and physical disruptions including capacity drop and congestion propagation. Based on the theory of piecewise-deterministic Markov processes and monotone dynamical systems, we derive ready-to-use criteria for boundedness of traffic densities and characterize the maximally attainable throughput under various classes of control laws. The examples in this paper focus on transportation applications, but with minor modifications, our modeling, analysis, and design methods can be applied to a general class of network systems facing cyber-physical disruptions.
Previous work on dynamic flow networks typically focused on the nominal or the robust setting. Many results have been developed for disruption-free networks [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] , which provide hints for the disruption-prone setting. Robust control strategies have been developed in response to physical (i.e. link capacity) disruptions [20, 21] . Importantly, Como et al. [22] developed tools for evaluating network resiliency under distributed routing strategies against adversarial disturbances. However, robust control focuses on the worst cases associated with major or catastrophic disruptions; for the non-catastrophic but recurrent disruptions considered in this paper, those approaches may be over-conservative and inefficient [22] . In the stochastic setting, results have been developed for network stability under capacity perturbations. Control design approaches have been developed for a single server subject to capacity disruptions [10, 23] . Jin and Amin analyzed the stability under capacity disruptions for networks that have special structures, such as parallel links [3] and serial links [24] . However, limited results are available for general networks with finite link storage spaces, and the current models hardly capture spillback in general, which is a major challenge for network flow control. Cyber disruptions have been considered in a body of work on generic fault-tolerant control; see e.g. [25] . Particularly for network systems, some results have been developed for fault detection/correction [26] and resilient control design 2 Dynamic flow network with cyber-physical disruptions Consider a single-origin-single-destination, acyclic network with a set of directed links K = {1, 2, . . . , K}. Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists an origin link numbered as link 1 and a destination link numbered as link K; see Figure 1 . The origin is subject to a constant inflow of α ∈ R ≥0 . Let X k (t) be the traffic density of link k at time t. For link k with finite storage space, X k (t) can only take values from a closed interval [0, x max k ], where x max k is called the jam density. For link k with infinite storage space, X k (t) can take value from R ≥0 . In particular, we assume that link 1 has infinite storage space; this ensures that no traffic is rejected at the origin. We use X k to denote the set of X k (t) and use X = k∈K X k to denote the set of the state vector X(t). We use O k (resp. I k ) to denote the set of downstream (resp. upstream) adjacent links for each link k ∈ K. We also let N p := k∈K |O k | denote the total number of pairs of adjacent links. We say that link k is accessible from link i if there exists a directed path starts with link i and ends at link k. For each link k ∈ K, let M k ⊆ K be the set of links from which link k is accessible, and let N k ⊆ K be the set of links that are accessible from link k.
In the rest of this section, we first define the flow functions, control laws, and disruption modes (Section 2.1), and then specify the network's dynamics as a piecewise-deterministic Markov process (Section 2.2). Finally, we define network stability and throughput (Section 2.3).
Flow, control, and disruptions
In the following, we introduce some definitions and assumptions that are essential for our network model. We also provide examples to illustrate the applicability of our modeling approach.
Flow functions
The sending flow out of link k is specified by a function f k : X k → R ≥0 . The receiving flow into link k is specified by a function r k : X k → R ≥0 . We assume that the flow functions f k and r k satisfy the following: Assumption 1 (Monotone flow function).
1. For each link k, the sending flow f k (x k ) is continuous and non-decreasing in x k . Furthermore, f k (0) = 0 and sup f k (x k ) < ∞.
2. For each link k, the receiving flow r k (x k ) is continuous and non-increasing in x k . Furthermore, r k (x max k ) = 0 for link k with finite storage space.
Then the capacity F k is defined by
which indicates the maximum available sending flow. We also define the critical density x c k as the smallest x k such that the sending flow attains the capacity value. Practically, a link is typically considered as "congested" when the density exceeds the critical density.
Below are several examples of practical flow functions.
(i) Road traffic: in the cell transmission model (CTM [38] ), x k represents the density of vehicles over a road section, and the sending flow out of the section is given by
where v is the free-flow speed and F k is the capacity of the section. The receiving flow into the kth section is
, where w is the congestion-wave speed.
(ii) Production line: in manufacturing systems [39] , x k measures the workload, and the flow (or average throughput) out of a station can be modeled via the clearing function
where is a positive constant.
(iii) Data packets: in communication networks [5, 10] , one can approximate the flow of discrete packets as a fluid model. x k represents the number of packets waiting for service. The flow out of a server can be approximated as
where u k is the inflow and F k can be interpreted as the service rate. Since this flow function is discontinuous in x k , the following flow function can be used as a simple but useful approximation:
where ρ k is a positive constant. The above is in fact a generic flow function that is relevant to various applications [22] .
Control laws
We consider that the flows between links are controlled by a control law µ : X → R Np ≥0 . That is, µ kj (x) is the controlled flow from link k to link j. We assume that the control law µ satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Control law).
Continuity:
The control law µ is at least piecewise-continuous in each x k .
Monotonicity:
(a) For each k ∈ K and j ∈ O k , µ kj (x) is non-decreasing in x k ;
2.3 Boundedness: let ∆ y denotes the increment of variable y.
(a) For each k ∈ K, j∈O k ∆ µ kj is less than or equal to ∆ f k as x k changes;
(b) For each k ∈ K, i∈I k ∆ µ ik is less than or equal to ∆ r k as x k changes.
Note that we only assume piecewise continuity but do not require smoothness; this makes our approach applicable to a variety of non-smooth but practical models such as the CTM [38] . Assumption 2.2 implies we only consider distributed control laws. Assumption 2.3 ensures that the response of control law is bounded as the sending flow or the receiving flow changes. Below are several examples of practical control laws.
(i) Dynamic routing: a typical route choice model [40] is as follows
where θ j quantifies the sensitivity of route choice to x j .
(ii) Ramp metering: suppose that link j is a section of highway and link k is an on-ramp merging into the highway. A typical ramp metering policy is
, where u kj is the equilibrium on-ramp flow, κ kj is a positive gain, and x c j is the critical density of link j [41] .
(iii) Max-pressure control: consider a link k with two incoming links I(k) = {i 1 , i 2 }. Then,
can be viewed as the "pressure" from the two incoming links [15] . The max pressure control prioritizes the flow from the link with the maximal pressure:
Disruption modes
We consider a set S of disruption modes, which may include cyber and/or physical disruptions. In a mode with cyber disruptions, the control law µ, which is a mapping from link state to inter-link flows, will be modified. The modification can be due to incorrect state observation (sensing fault) or due to wrongly implemented control actions (actuating fault). In a mode with physical disruptions, the flow functions f k and r k will be modified to capture the capacity loss. To capture such modification, we introduce the mode s as a second argument into the flow functions and the control law. With a slight abuse of notation, we use
to denote the sending flow out of link k, the receiving flow into link k and the control law under disruptions, respectively. We assume that there exists a nominal model and that a disruption preserves the order of flows:
Assumption 3 (Order-preserving disruptions).
There exists a nominal mode s
In other mode s = s 0 , sending and receiving flow might suffer bounded disruptions
2. For each s ∈ S, µ(s, x) satisfies Assumption 2. Furthermore, if µ kj (s, x) is nonincreasing (resp. non-decreasing) in x i , i ∈ K for some s ∈ S, then µ kj (s , x) is non-increasing (resp. non-decreasing) in x i , i ∈ K, for all s ∈ S.
One can verify that, with order-preserving disruptions, the sending flow f k (s, x) and the receiving flow r k (s, x) still satisfy Assumption 1. Then, we define the mode-specific link capacities as F s,k := sup
The above disruption model applies to a rather broad class of practical scenarios; below are some examples:
(i) Capacity-reducing events: a failure mode typically has a capacity F s,k that is smaller than the nominal value.
Traffic incidents: f k (s, x k ) = min{vx k , F s,k }.
Server failure: f k (s, x k ) = F s,k (1 − e −ρx k ), where F s,k = 0 when the server breaks down.
(ii) Sensing faults: we can use a mapping T s,k : S × X → X to capture various sensing faults:
Bias: T s,k (x) = x k + δ s,k , where δ s,k is a mode-dependent bias.
Denial of service: T s,k (x) = 0 for some link k; this means that no observation is available for x k .
(iii) Actuating faults: consider the ramp metering strategy specified by [41] . Below are several failure modes:
. That is, the ramp is not metered at all.
where u s kj can be disrupted from the default value.
Piecewise-deterministic Markov model
With the definitions in the previous subsection, we can now define the piecewise-deterministic dynamics of the controlled process {(S(t), X(t)); t ≥ 0}. The discrete-state process {S(t); t ≥ 0} of the mode is a time-homogeneous finite-state Markov process that is independent of the continuous-state process {X(t); t ≥ 0} of the traffic densities. The state space of the mode process is S. The transition rate from mode s to mode s is λ s,s . Without loss of generality, we assume that λ s,s = 0 for all s ∈ S. Hence, the discrete-state process evolves as follows:
where δ denotes an infinitesimal increment. We assume that the discrete-state process is ergodic and admits a unique steady-state probability distribution {p s ; s ∈ S} satisfying 
The assumption of ergodicity essentially means that every disruption will be resolved in finite time almost surely. The interpretation of the transition rates λ s,s depends on the type of transition. In practice, discrete-state transitions can represent the occurrence and clearance of cyber-physical disruptions. The continuous-state process {X(t); t ≥ 0} is defined as follows. Under a given control law µ, the actual flow q µ kj (s, x) from link k to link j is given by
The three terms in min{·} are interpreted as follows. The first term is the control input, i.e. the flow desired by the system operator. The second term is the flow that link k can send, and the third term is the flow that link j can receive. The sending and receiving flows are allocated proportionally to µ kj (s, x), which is a standard modeling approach; for more discussion on this and alternative models, see [42] . Note that if the control law µ, sending flow f k and receiving flow r k satisfy Assumption 3, the actual flow q µ kj (s, x) has the following lemma, which we prove in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1 (Monotone actual flow). For any k ∈ K and j ∈ O k , q µ kj (s, x) is non-decreasing in x k ; for any k ∈ K and i ∈ I k , q µ ik (s, x) is non-increasing in x k . A key novelty in our modeling approach is that we allow the system operator (SO) to send non-admissible control inputs. This feature is essential for capturing the impact of cyberphysical disruptions. If the control law is properly designed and if there are no disruptions, then typically we have q µ kj (s, x) = µ kj (s, x). That is, the control law will never request a flow that the upstream link cannot offer or that the downstream link cannot accept. However, if the SO does not have perfect knowledge about the disruptions, the SO may request a flow that cannot be achieved. Therefore, the second and third terms in the right-hand side of (2) may become active if the control input is generated based on incomplete or incorrect information.
For any initial condition S(0) = s ∈ S and X(0) = x ∈ X , the evolution of traffic densities X(t) is governed by the conservation law associated with the actual flows:
It also defines the vector field G µ : S × X → R K specifying the flow dynamics. Note that Assumptions 1-3 ensure that X(t) is continuous in t. Importantly, G µ is bounded and cooperative [34] as stated in Lemmas 2 and 3, which are proved in Appendix A.2 and A.3 respectively.
The joint evolution of S(t) and X(t) is a piecewise-deterministic Markov process (PDMP) and can be described compactly using an infinitesimal generator [29, 43] 
for any differentiable function g : S × X → R K , where ∇ x g(s, x) is the gradient of g with respect to x.
Additional definitions
In this subsection, we introduce some definitions that we will use for our subsequent arguments.
Stability
A key step for both throughput analysis and control design is to determine the stability of the network under certain controls. We say that the network is stable if there exists Z < ∞ such that for any initial condition (s, x) ∈ S × X lim sup
This notion of stability follows a classical definition [13] , which can be called "first-moment stable" [44] . Practically, network stability means that the traffic densities in all links are bounded on average.
Invariant set
An invariant set X µ under a control law µ is a closed subset of the continuous state space X such that for each initial condition (s, x) ∈ S × X µ , we have X(t) ∈ X µ for t ≥ 0. That is, if the continuous process {X(t), t ≥ 0} starts within X µ , then it will always remain within X µ , regardless of the discrete process {S(t); t ≥ 0}. In addition, definē
Note thatx µ k may be infinite.
Throughput and min-cut capacities
The throughput α µ of a network with control µ is defined as the maximal demand that the network can accept while maintaining stability:
A network's throughput is closely related to the network's min-cut capacity (MCC) that equals the maximum network flow [37] . A cut C is a partition of vertices of a graph into two disjoint subsets [22] . Let C be the set of cuts. For a network with a set of links K and constant link capacities {F k ; k ∈ K}, the min-cut capacity is defined as
Flow ratios
We first define diverging ratios
for link k ∈ K, where u * kj are the solutions to following linear programming:
Note that P1 can be recognized as the maximum flow problem and we have max
Further, we recursively define flow ratios
where γ ii := 1. One can see that γ mk is defined if and only if link k is accessible from link m. The flow ratios have the following lemma that is proved in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 4. For any demand α < C( s∈S p s F s,k ; K), we have γ 1k α < s∈S p s F s,k .
Throughput analysis
In this section, we analyze a network's stability and throughput under given controls. The main results are sufficient conditions that check whether the network is stable given a demand and control law (Theorem 1 and Proposition 1). They allow quantitative analysis of network throughput.
To state the result, we first define the following sets:
Besides, defineÑ µ k as the set of links such that for any link j ∈Ñ µ k and over the invariant set X µ , (i) j is accessible from k, (ii) j can be congested, (iii) j can cause spillback, and (iv) every link between k and j satisfies (i), (ii), (iii). Here congestion means that traffic density exceeds the critical density and spillback means that the desired flow into link j is less than the receiving flow offered by link j.
We also define
and
where ρ μ n : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is given below:
Finally, we state the main result as follows:
Theorem 1 (Stability condition). Consider a network with a demand α and a control µ :
for any k ∈ K µ and s ∈ S, where p s are steady-state probabilities of the disruption mode given by (1a) -(1c) and
One can analyze the network's throughput by finding the supremum of those demands α that satisfy the criterion (14) . Since this criterion is a sufficient condition, it in general leads to a lower bound for the network's throughput. But this sufficient condition for stability is also necessary in particular settings, such as networks with infinite link storage spaces (see Theorem 3). Verifying (14) involves solving a set of maximization and minimization problems (15a)-(15b) only over compact sets. This is a significant contribution with respect to the general stability criteria, which essentially require maximization over the possibly unbounded set X µ [32] .
To implement Theorem 1, one can either use insights about the flow dynamics to analytically solve the maximization and minimization problems or use numerical heuristics. The former is particularly relevant for proving properties of certain controls, such as Theorems 2 and 3 in the next section. The latter is relevant for analyzing the stability of networks with given parameters, such as the example in Section 3.1.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on Foster-Lyapunov criterion [32] (Section 3.2). By sightly increasing the complexity of the Lyapunov function, we derive a second and tighter stability condition: Proposition 1. Consider a network with a demand α and a control µ : S × X → R Np ≥0 . Suppose that the network admits an invariant set X µ ⊆ X under the control µ.Then the network is stable if
where a set of parameters b s kñ satisfies 1 2
x However, it could require heavy computation costs due to the nonlinear constraints (16) and (17) . The rest of this section is devoted to a numerical example for throughput analysis based on the stability condition (Section 3.1) and the proof of Theorem 1 (Section 3.2) and Proposition 1 (Section 3.3).
Numerical example
Consider the network in Figure 2 , which is a classical example network for traffic control [45] . The sending flow function of link k is given by
where v f > 0 is a coefficient of free-flow speed [38] and F s,k is the capacity of link k in mode s. The receiving flow functions are given by
where F k is the nominal capacity and x c k is the critical density of link k, and w c > 0 is a coefficient of congestion-wave speed [38] . For the maximum densities, we have
x c k + F k /w c , link k has finite storage space, ∞, link k has infinite storage space. In this example, we set v f = w c = 1. Figure 2 shows the values for F k and x c k . Link 5 is subject to the cyber disruption, which makes the traffic state x 5 appear to be zero to the system oprator. Links 6 is subject to the physical disruption, which reduces the capacity of link 6 to zero. Table 1 specifies the cyber disruption characterized by the fault mapping T s,5 (x 5 ) and the physical disruption characterized by the mode-specific capacity F s, 6 . The other links are not subject to disruptions; i.e. T s,k (x k ) = x k for all s and all k = 5, and F s,k = F k for all s and all k = 6. Hence, the network has four modes. If the network suffers the cyber and physical disruption simultaneously, the mode transition rate matrix is
where λ s,s denotes the transition rate from mode s to mode s [46] . The steady-state probabilities p s can be computed for the mode s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}:
At the diverges, the traffic flows are routed according to the classical logit model:
In this example, we select ν = 2 as the sensitivity coefficient. At the merges, we assume that one incoming link is strictly prioritized over the other. Specifically, at merge 1 link 4 is prioritized over link 5, and at merge 2 link 3 is prioritized over link 6. Such priorities can be realized by
Before we apply Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 to derive the throughput given different storage spaces and disruptions, we construct the following rectangular invariant set:
We start from the lower boundary. If link 5 is free from the cyber disruption, we have = ω 5 , where ω 2 and ω 5 are the solutions to the following system of equations:
Then, according to the network structure, we have the following relationships for the lower boundary of link k = 2, · · · , 7: 
For the upper boundaries of other links, there are the following relationships:
o.w., 
, where the densities of link 2, 4, 5, 6 attain the maximum value due to congestion spillback. Table 2 lists the network throughput in various scenarios, where α logit t , α logit p and α logit sim denote the throughput derived from Theorem 1, Proposition 1 and the numerical simulation, respectively. We can see the simulation value α logit sim as the true boundary. It is reasonable to find that Proposition 1 leads to a tighter bound than Theorem 1.
The results demonstrate that cyber-physical disruptions will decrease the network performance. For instance, shown in Table 2 , the throughput decreases to 0.944 when the network with finite space suffers physical disruptions. It further reduces to 0.800 when the network is also subject to cyber disruptions. A counter-intuitive finding is that disruptions have more significant impacts given the infinite link storage space. The reason lies in that the congestion in link 6 will not affect the upstream routing at diverge 1 and 2 because link 6 has infinite storage. This finding shows that inappropriate controls will also result in throughput loss. 
Proof of Theorem 1
This proof uses a Lyapunov function-based approach. To show the network's stability, we only need to show the boundedness of the traffic densities in link k ∈ K µ . Besides, we only need to consider initial conditions in the invariant set X µ [43] . Consider the Lyapunov function V : S × X µ → R below:
We prove Theorem 1 by showing that if (14) holds, then there exist constants a k > 0, b s k ≥ 0, c > 0, and d < ∞ that satisfy the following criterion:
Foster-Lyapunov criterion [32] . Consider a Markov process {Y (t) : t ≥ 0} with state space Y, an infinitesimal generator L , and a Lyapunov function W : Y → R ≥0 . If there exist constants c > 0, d < ∞ and a function g :
then, for each initial condition y(0) ∈ Y, lim sup
To proceed, apply the infinitesimal generator L to the Lyapunov function V :
where D µ k (s, x) is given by
Note that xm is bounded for eachm ∈M µ k and that xñ is bounded for eachñ ∈Ñ µ k . Besides,
In the following, we prove that there exist c > 0 and d k < ∞ for any link k ∈ K µ such that
We discuss two cases: 1) x k ≤ x c k and 2)
In case of x k > x c k , according to Lemmas 1 and 3, we have
where the definition z s k is clear from the above. Then, b s k are the solutions to
The existence of b s k is guaranteed by the following technical result, which we prove in Appendix A.5:
Lemma 5. The system of equations (19) has a non-negative solution for b s k , s ∈ S, k ∈ K µ .
To show the existence of a k , note that G µ n (s, x) is bounded; hence there exists δ < ∞ such that
Since (14) implies that s∈S p s z s k < 0 for each k ∈ K µ , the existence of a k is guaranteed by the following technical result, which we prove in Appendix A.6: Lemma 6. The system of equations η k a k + δ n∈N µ k a n < 0, ∀k ∈ K µ (20) has a strictly positive solution for a k if η k < 0 for each k ∈ K µ .
Combining the results in the two cases of x k ≤ x c k and x k > x c k shows that there exist c > 0 and d k < ∞ satisfying (18) for any link k ∈ K µ .
Finally
It indicates that we can conclude stability of the network by the Foster-Lyapunov criterion.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the Lyapnov function
Since (17) ensures this Lyapunov function to be non-negative, we can apply Foster-Lynapunov criterion. Note that this Lyapunov function is non-differentiable with respect to x k at x µ k andx µ k , but it is right-differentiable (resp. left-differentiable) with respect to x k at x µ k (resp. x µ k ). The infinitesimal generator L gives
According to the proof of Theorem 1, we need only prove
So given (16) , we can conclude that Foster-Lyapunov criterion is achieved.
Control design
In this section, we design control laws to improve network throughput. A classical result in network control is the max-flow min-cut theorem, which characterizes the maximally attainable throughput in terms of link capacities [37] . We will extend the notion of min-cut capacity (MCC) to stochastic networks and present a series of results characterizing the throughput under various classes of control laws. Two extensions of MCC are considered in the stochastic setting. The min-expected-cut capacity (MECC) is the minimum cut capacity evaluated with the expected capacity of each link:
The expected-min-cut capacity (EMCC) is the expected minimum cut capacity over various modes:
The MECC and the EMCC are in general not equal. In fact, one can show that the MECC is no less than the EMCC. Figure 3 illustrates the EMCC (0.75) and MECC (1) of the network in Figure 2 , where the min-cuts are highlighted as solid arrows. Next, we investigate in which case there exist controls that attain EMCC/MECC. We show that i) for a network with observable disruption modes, there exists a mode-dependent control that attains the EMCC (Theorem 2) and (ii) for a network with infinite link storage spaces, there exists an open-loop control that attains the MECC (Theorem 3). However, MECC might not be attainable in general cases. So we also design a closed-loop control with a guaranteed lower-bound (Theorem 4).
For the mode-aware setting, we derive Theorem 2 that is analogous to the classical maxflow min-cut theorem [37] . It states that there exists a mode-dependent control that attains the minimum expected cut capacity. The control is given by
where u * kj (s) is the optimal solution to the linear program
Theorem 2 (Max-flow expected-min-cut). Consider a dynamic flow network with a demand α. Suppose that the system operator can correctly observe the mode S(t) for t ≥ 0. Then, µ md given by (23) attains the expected-min-cut capacity s∈S p s C(F s,k ; K).
Theorem 3 is used if every link has an infinite storage space. This theorem states that there exists a control that attains the minimum expected cut capacity without observing disruption modes and network states. The control is as follows:
where F max k denotes among F s,k . For general network (with incorrect sensing/actuating or with finite link storage spaces), one can indeed apply Theorem 1 to obtain a closed-loop control. However, since Theorem 1 considers general control, the relation between the control µ and the throughput α µ is not an explicit one. To facilitate control design, we restrict the structure of the control such that
Note that the control input could be modified by disruption modes. The constraint (26) ensures densities are bounded except in link 1, and the constraint (27) requires that the controlled inflow does not exceed the receiving flow. For such a restricted control, we derive the following lower bound.
Theorem 4 (Lower-bounded throughput). Consider a dynamic flow network with a control µ dd that satisfies (26)- (27) . Suppose that the network admits an invariant set X µ under control µ dd . Then, µ dd can attain a throughput lower-bounded by
This result is significantly simpler than Theorem 1 in terms of computation, since the lower-bound is independent of demand α. Hence, we can directly use this result for control design.
The rest of this section first illustrates the above results with a numerical example (Section 4.1) and then proves them respectively (Section 4.2-4.4).
Numerical example
Consider again the network in Figure 2 . We apply our results to three control laws in various scenarios. The three control laws are open-loop µ ol , mode-dependent µ md , and densitydependent µ dd . The open-loop control assigns constant flows between links, independent of both the mode and the traffic densities. The mode-dependent control adjusts the flows according to the mode but independent of the traffic densities. The density-dependent control determines the flows according to the traffic densities and independent of the mode. More details of the three controls are available in Section 4.1.1-4.1.3. Table 3 first summarizes the main features of the control laws. It clearly illustrates the pros and cons of these controls. Importantly, the open-loop controls requires prior knowledge of the inter-mode transition rates, which may not be easily obtained in practice. Furthermore, observation of mode requires quick detection of disruptions, which may not be easy in practice. Hence, density-dependent control is more practical. However, density-dependent control relies on traffic state observation and is thus vulnerable to cyber disruptions, such as sensing faults, while the mode-dependent and open-loop control are not.
Besides, Table 3 lists the control performance in various scenarios, where the subscripts "t", "p" and "sim" denote the throughput derived from Theorem 1, Proposition 1 and the numerical simulation. To implement Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, we design the rectangular invariant sets for each control, which is similar to that for the logit routing.
The results successfully verify Theorem 2 and 3. The expected-min-cut capacity (EMCC) subject to (resp. free from) the physical disruptions equals 0.75 (resp. 1) and is attainable given the mode-dependent control; the min-expected-cut capacity (MECC) equals 1 and is available under the open-loop control when all the links have infinite storage spaces. When the link storage spaces become finite, the open-loop control might not attain MECC mainly due to spillback.
The results also support the statement that density-dependent control is vulnerable to cyber disruptions. For instance, if every link has an finite storage space, the throughput under the density-dependent control deceases due to cyber disruptions. Note that densitydependent control does not perform better given the infinite storage spaces. It is because the control is more restricted to prevent the traffic density x 5 from being boundless when the network is subject to cyber disruptions (Section 4.1.3).
We also compare the designed controls with the classical routing policy ( Table 2 ). The comparison reveals that µ md , µ ol and µ dd outperform the classical control in most cases.
Next, we present and discuss details about the three controls.
Mode-dependent control
The control µ md is obtained from solving the linear programming P2 for each disruption mode s. Then we have Table 4 . Note that there are no flows from link 2 to link 4, so link 4 can be neglected. 
Density-dependent control
We design the following density-dependent control: where T 5 (s, x 5 ) is the fault mapping given in Table 1 . Since link 3 and 7 will not be congested, it is not necessary to control the flows into them. When link 5 has infinite storage, the controlled inflow is more restricted to prevent the traffic density x 5 from being boundless. Note that Theorem 4 can be used except when the links with finite storage spaces are subject to both cyber and physical disruptions because (27) does not hold in this case.
Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 mainly based on Theorem 1. The proof involves Lemma 7, which we prove in the appendix. Note that O 1 is a cut, so we have j∈O 1 µ md 1j (s) = C(F s,k ; K). Finally, Theorem 1 says that the system will be stable if α < s∈S p s C(F s,k ; K). It means µ md attains the expected-mincut capacity s∈S p s C(F s,k ; K).
Proof of Theorem 3 4.3.1 Sufficiency
This proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. Note that we haveÑ µ k = ∅ because all the links have infinite storage and congestion spillback will not happen, so we consider the reduced Lyapunov function
Then, apply the infinitesimal generator L to the Lyapunov function V :
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we need only prove
Note that, for any link m ∈ M k , we have So we obtain
According to Lemma 4, we further have
given any α < C( s∈S p s F s,k ; K). So the system will be stable if α < C( s∈S p s F s,k ; K). It means the open-loop control µ ol attains the min-expected-cut capacity.
Concluding remarks
We propose a novel approach to the analysis and design of traffic control for dynamic flow networks suffering cyber-physical disruptions. First, we apply piecewise-deterministic Markov process to modeling disruptions and their impacts on network dynamics. Then, a stability condition (Theorem 1) is derived with the Lyapunov-based method. By slightly changing the Lyapunov function, we derive a stronger stability condition (Proposition 1). The stability analysis contributes to two specific controls. The first one can attain expected-min-cut capacity of the network if the disruptions are observable (Theorem 2); the second one can attain min-expected-cut capacity if all the links have infinite storage space (Theorem 3). For the general case, we also propose a density-dependent control whose lower-bounded throughput is guaranteed (Theorem 4). The discussion shows density-dependent control is more practical, but the numerical example also demonstrates its vulnerability to the cyber disruptions. This work can serve as the basis for multiple future studies. First, applying stability condition involves constrained nonlinear optimization. Thus, it is worthwhile finding efficient numerical heuristics methods, especially for large-scale networks. Second, the optimal density-dependent control still remains to be addressed. Finally, the modeling technique and stability analysis can be customized and applied to more specific problems, such as resilient ramp metering. which means the second term is non-decreasing in x k . If 
Note that (30) implies
So the third term is non-decreasing in x k . Finally, we can conclude that q µ kj (s, x) is nondecreasing in x k for any j ∈ O k . The monotonicity of q µ ik can be proved in a similar way.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Finite sending flow f k (s, x) indicates the actual flow q µ kj (s, x) is also limited. So G µ k (s, x) is bounded for any link k.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 1 states that q µ kj (s, x) is non-decreasing in x k while q µ ik (s, x) is non-increasing in x k . Then, from the definition of G µ k (s, x) in (3a)-(3c), we can verify that G µ k (s, x) is nonincreasing in x k and G µ (s, x) is non-decreasing in x k for ∈ O k ∪ I k .
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Note u * 1 = max u 1 = C( s∈S p s F s,k ; K). By definition, we have γ 1k u * 1 = i∈I k u * ik ≤ s∈S p s F s,k . So this lemma holds up given any α < C( s∈S p s F s,k ; K).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
To show the existence of b s k , we represent the involved quantities in matrix form. Let Λ be the transition rate matrix for the discrete state process {S(t); t > 0}. That is, we number the discrete states s ∈ S as integers 1, 2, . . . , m, where m is the cardinality of S. Let λ ij be the transition rate from the ith discrete state (say s) to the jth discrete state (say s ); λ ij = λ(s, s ). Furthermore, we define λ ii = − j =i λ ij for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. Thus, we can define the following matrix:
Let p = [p 1 p 2 · · · p m ] T be the steady-state probabilities of the discrete state process, i.e. a row vector satisfying p T Λ = 0, p ≥ 0, |p|= 1
where |·| is the 1-norm. One can easily show that the above is equivalent to (1a).
To show the existence of a solution, note that (19) is equivalent to
Since the discrete state process is ergodic, the rank of the matrix Λ is m − 1. Scaling each row i with p i and adding the scaled rows 1,2,...,m − 1 to row m, we obtain
By (33), we know that i =1 p i λ ij − p j i =j λ ji = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , m.
Also note that
Hence, the rank of the augmented coefficient matrix of the system of linear equations (34) is also m − 1, equal to the rank of the coefficient matrix. Therefore, (34) must have a solution [46, p.154 ].
For other s = s * , we also have G md K (s, x * ) ≤ 0. Since the Markov process of disruption modes is ergodic, x K will decrease tox md K if its initial value is larger thanx md K , which impliesx md K is a upper bound of the invariant set of X md K . As indicated in (35) , the desired flow into link K is not less than the receiving flow r K (s, x K ) given the upper boundx md K . It is also means that link K is not the bottleneck for link i ∈ I K , and there is similar proof for each link i ∈ I K . In this way, we can verify the links step by step.
To prove K µ = {1}, we show thatx md k < ∞ for any k = 1. Note thatÑ µ 1 = ∅ indicates there are no downstream bottlenecks and that the mode-dependent control satisfies (24c). So, for link k = 1, we have x k < ∞ given any finite initial value.
